Perceptual speech hash and robust watermarking have been widely investigated to solve the problems of authenticating speech integrity. The former generates a watermark and the latter embeds the watermark into the speech signal to implement speech integrity authentication. In this paper, we propose a perceptual speech hash algorithm and a robust watermarking algorithm for speech integrity authentication. To obtain perceptual speech hash values, we propose a gammatone filter model of the speech signal to extract sensitive auditory features (denoted by gammatone features). A random Gaussian matrix is used to reduce the dimensionality of the features of the gammatone to generate perceptual speech hash values. For the watermarking algorithm, we construct learned dictionaries to obtain the robust sparse feature of coefficients of the stationary wavelet transforms, and embed a watermark (perceptual speech hash values) into the sparse feature by patchwork and quantization index modulation. We illustrate the good imperceptibility of the authentication scheme in terms of the signal-to-noise ratio, objective difference grade, and subjective difference grade, and verify its robustness against common signal processing operations while maintaining imperceptibility. Moreover, our proposed method is sensitive to the malicious modification of the watermarked speech. Compared with state-of-the-art algorithms, the proposed algorithm can obtain better comprehensive performance in the detection and localization of tampering with the content of speech.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of the Internet, digital multimedia materials can be transmitted efficiently. At the same time, they can be easily copied or modified without permission. In particular, as processing software and tools have become widely accessible, tampering digital multimedia data has become increasingly easy. Adversaries can carry out various kinds of tampering operations on digital multimedia content−for example, inserting, deleting, and replacing−that can have significant social and economic repercussions. Speech signals are important multimedia signals, and include The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was SK Hafizul Islam . military commands, recorded evidence in courts, and online speech orders. Hence, protecting the integrity of digital speech content is important in the field of information security. The human ear can detect even a small change in auditory speech signals. In comparison with digital image integrity authentication, less attention has been paid to speech integrity authentication because it is more challenging.
A. CONNECTIONS WITH OTHER TECHNOLOGIES
A speech integrity authentication scheme, in general, requires two elements: an authentication watermark and a watermarking method. First, speech integrity authentication algorithms based on speech watermarking are challenging to develop for several reasons. The human ear is much more sensitive VOLUME 8, 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ to sound than the eyes are to light, because of which image watermarking schemes cannot be applied directly to speech signals. Compared with a digital image signal, a digital speech signal has fewer samples within every interval, which means that less data can be used to embed a watermark in the speech signal. The above indicates that speech watermarking is more challenging than image watermarking. According to previously proposed speech integrity authentication schemes, watermarking methods used for speech integrity authentication can be classified into robust speech watermarking and fragile speech watermarking. However, most past research on speech integrity authentication has focused on fragile speech watermarking [1] - [4] . While studies have rarely considered it, robust speech watermarking has the properties of inaudibility, being tamper-proof, and tolerance to common non-malicious signal processing operations, but it is fragile to malicious falsification [5] - [8] . In applications, robust speech watermarking is considered more useful for speech integrity authentication. Fragile speech watermarking is useful to this end but cannot distinguish between content-persistent speech signal processing operations and malicious tampering. Furthermore, in applications, speech signals are inevitably subjected to content-persistent signal processing, such as MP3 compression, noise addition, resampling, and re-quantization. In this case, fragile watermarking suffers in terms of detecting tampering. Robust speech watermarking can tolerate content-persistent nonmalicious speech signal processing operations and detect malicious tamperers. Second, the authentication watermark is mainly based on perceptual speech hash. Technologies related to perceptual speech hash [9] - [12] include robust speech hash and digital speech fingerprinting. Robust speech hash [13] , [14] is similar to perceptual speech hash in that both require that the mapping between speech content and speech hash be robust. However, robust speech hash tends to select invariant features to establish the mapping, whereas perceptual speech hash is generated using perceptual features derived from human auditory characteristics. Therefore, it is more efficient for mining speech content. There are two main uses of digital speech fingerprinting [15] - [17] . On the one hand, it is the robust watermark primarily applied to copyright. On the other, digital speech fingerprinting, which is a speech hashing technology, is primarily applied to speech content recognition. The perceptual speech hash is similar to digital speech fingerprinting but they are not equivalent. All the above three technologies are needed to ensure tolerance of content-preserving operations while detecting tampering attacks. The results of past research are valuable to this end [9] - [17] . However, although many studies refer to the ''speech perceptual hash,'' they are not related to the human auditory characteristics. Recent work has primarily focused on detecting compromised regions of speech. Major research in the area can be divided into two categories: robust features-based methods [15] - [17] and perceptual hash-based methods [9] - [12] . Robust features-based methods use statistical features of speech frames to generate short, binary representations. Such methods can detect changed speech regions, but their accuracy is unreliable. Perceptual hash-based methods use the feature points of speech to generate a hash code. Such methods struggle to yield good detection accuracy. The essence of speech integrity authentication is that the authenticity of the content of speech can be identified. Therefore, extracting the perceptual features of speech has become important in speech integrity authentication.
B. PAST WORKS
To sum up the above, watermarking methods applied to speech integrity authentication are mainly based on audio watermarking [1] - [8] . Current audio watermarking methods, which can be used for speech signals, are representative of state of the-art audio watermarking technologies [18] - [23] . The robust watermarking methods proposed in [18] - [23] , the statistics-based method in [18] - [21] , the HAS-based method in [22] (Human's Auditory System method), and the spread spectrum-based method in [23] do well in tolerating content-persistent common signal processing operations. However, they cannot be applied to embed watermarks in speech integrity authentication schemes for three reasons. First, the methods in [20] , [21] have low detection accuracy. That is, while they exhibit optimal imperceptibility and robustness against content-persistent common signal processing operations, their embedding rate is only 10 bps. They require a greater length of detection of frames for speech authentication, which reduces detection accuracy. Second, to balance robustness against tolerance to content-persistent common signal processing and a high embedding rate, in [22] , [23] , the encoder and decoder require a long frame for speech integrity authentication, which reduces detection accuracy. Third, the methods in [18] and [19] exhibit a higher embedding rate than the others because the Discrete Cosine Transform and Discrete Wavelet Transform (DCT-DWT) domain [18] ensure good robustness even though the frame length is small. Moreover, this method uses the statistical characteristics of frequency to embed data, which reduces distortion and improves robustness. The method in [19] can achieve a high rate of embedding because it uses multilayer embedding.
To the best of the author's knowledge, little research has considered the perceptual speech hash. Pioneer work in the area was reported in [9] - [13] . Zhang et al. [10] proposed a feature value-based perceptual speech hash approach using modified discrete cosine transform (MDCT) and compressed sensing (CS). The MDCT is applied to the speech frame to extract feature values, the number of dimensions of which are reduced by a measurement matrix in CS. The speech hash is then generated by comparing adjacent feature values. Zhang et al. also [11] presented a perceptual speech hash using content-based speech encryption. In [11] , an encrypted speech was divided into overlapping frames, and the cross-correlation coefficients of two adjacent frames of the encrypted speech signal were calculated to obtain a cross-correlation matrix. Non-negative matrix factorization (NMF) was then used to reduce the dimensions of the matrix to generate a perceptual speech hash code. Chen and Xiao [12] reported a perceptual audio hash based on the Zernike moment and maximum-likelihood watermark detection, in this scheme, an audio was divided into non-overlapping frames, and a feature vector was constructed based on the amplitude of the low-order Zernike moments of every audio frame. The feature vector was modeled by the Rayleigh distribution with virtual watermarks using maximum likelihood watermark detection to form the hash code. In [13] , the global and local features of an audio signal were used to generate the hash code. The global features were composed of Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients and the local features were captured by a basis constructed using the non-negative constraints of the NMF. Liu et al. [8] proposed a statistics-based robust speech hash method. In [9] , hash codes were generated using DWT coefficients that were modified using a measurement matrix. All these methods provide unsatisfactory robustness because of a lack of comprehensive speech-related features. Furthermore, although significant progress has been made in perceptual audio hash technology, few studies have considered auditory features.
C. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, an algorithm for a speech integrity authentication system is proposed. Using the proposed algorithm, a detection and localization method for speech tampering is developed. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: (1) A gammatone filter model is applied to a speech signal to extract sensitive auditory features that can help obtain perceptual speech content.
(2) A random Gaussian matrix obtained from a CS model is applied to reduce the dimensionality of the vector, and DWT and norm are used to generate the final perceptual speech hash. (3) Learned dictionaries are used to learn the coefficients of SWT and obtain the robustness feature for the watermarking method. The watermark is finally embedded by utilizing quantization index modulation (QIM) and patchwork. (4) The proposed algorithm is robust against a wide of range of common signal processing operations, such as additional noise, low-pass filtering, high-pass filtering, re-sampling, re-quantization, MP3 compression, AAC compression, WMA compression, echo addition, muting, and denoising. It is also sensitive to the malicious modification of the watermarked speech. (5) The proposed method has the capability of detecting and localizing tampered speech. It yields better performance overall than state-of-theart schemes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: research related to the proposed speech authentication scheme is given in Section II, and details of the proposed algorithms are provided in Section III. The performance analysis and experimental results in Section IV verify the effectiveness of our algorithms. Finally, the conclusions of this paper are presented in Section V. 
II. RELATED WORK A. FRAMEWORK OF SPEECH INTEGRITY AUTHENTICATION
In general, a speech integrity authentication system consists of three stages: watermark production and description, watermark embedding and extraction, and detection and localization of tampered speech. The overall framework is shown in Fig. 1 . A watermark based on features of speech is established to construct a medium that is embedded into the original speech. This is accomplished via signal processing methods to remove redundant information while retaining perceptually significant features. Watermark embedding is used to hide the medium in the original speech. The watermark is combined or computed reversibly with the inert part, and has no significant effect on perceptual quality. In case of tampering, it can be detected and localized can by extracting the medium.
In this section, two tools are introduced, which are used in the proposed speech integrity authentication algorithm: perceptual speech hash and the gammatone filter. The constraints and properties of perceptual speech hash are introduced in Section II-B, and the gammatone filter, which is used to extract features of perceptual speech, is given in Section II-C.
B. PERCEPTUAL SPEECH HASH
Perceptual speech hash, which maps the perceptual content of a speech signal to a short binary string, can be considered a digital digest of the speech content. It is based on objective speech content rather than a simply subjective description. Moreover, cryptographic hash functions are highly sensitive to slight changes. Although they are similar in form, perceptual speech hash is extensible and tolerates the fuzziness of a small difference in calculating speech content. We consider it to be a mapping that satisfies some constraints [24] :
We denote the original speech signal by A, the copy of its perceptual content by A, and the difference in their perceptual contents by A D . A given perceptual speech hash function H K (·) with secret key K , which is based on the perceptual content of the original speech A, should possess the following properties: One-way
• Property: The process of hash value generation should be irreversible. In other words, it is feasible to obtain the perceptual hash value from the corresponding speech content, and unfeasible to regain the speech content from the corresponding perceptual hash value. We can formalize this by
• Perceptual Sensibility: The contents of different speeches should have different perceptual hash values. We can formalize this by
• Perceptual Robustness: The function produces the same or very similar hash values for the perceptual contents of identical speeches. That is to say,
• Compactness: The size of the original speech should be much greater than that of the perceptual hash value. We can formalize this by Size{H K (A)} Size{A}.
• Security: The function without the secret key K cannot generate identical perceptual hash values. We can formalize this by Pr{H K (A) = H K (A)} < ς, ς → 0. where Pr{·} denotes probability. And all the above parameters should be in the range (0, 1). a → b means that a converges toward b.
C. GAMMATONE FEATURE
A particular gammatone filter [25] , [26] has a gamma part and a tone part as follows:
where g(t) is the gammatone kernel, t is the time index, f c denotes the center frequency, U is the filter order, and the phase is θ. The bandwidth of f c is determined via function b(f c ). U and b(f c ) are used to tune the gamma part of g(t). By imitating human auditory filters, the center frequency f c is uniformly spaced on the equivalent rectangular bandwidth (ERB) scale. The function b(f c ) is as follows:
b(f c ) = 1.019 · ERB(f c ) = 1.019 · 24.7 · (4.37 · f c /1000 + 1)
The above feature is constructed via a cochleagram, which is a feature of speech. Bandwidth b(f c ) increases when f c increases, leading to higher resolutions at lower frequencies and lower resolutions at higher frequencies. Moreover, the effective length of a gammatone is defined by the duration for which the envelope is greater than 1% of the maximum value of the gammatone. Note that all features of a speech signal can be extracted when a 32-channel cochleagram is used. Bandwidths and center frequencies of the gammatone are fixed, and correspond to 32 critical bands of hearing.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
The proposed speech integrity authentication algorithm consists of three phases: a perceptual speech hash generation algorithm, a robust speech watermarking algorithm, and a watermark decoding and integrity authentication algorithm.
A. PERCEPTUAL SPEECH HASH GENERATION
The basic idea of the perceptual speech hash generation algorithm is to mine some features of speech that are robust to common signal processing operations. Although many robust hash extractors based on feature points are available for audio processing [9] - [17] −such as the Zernike moment, maximum likelihood watermark extractor [12] , Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients, and the NMF extractor [13] −they struggle to provide good detection accuracy of speech integrity authentication. In this paper, we employ a gammatone filter model and random Gaussian matrix in the proposed feature points extractor, which are more robust than prevalent extractors [12] , [13] . For our perceptual speech hash generation algorithm, we suppose that an original speech signal denoted by S = {s l |0 ≤ l ≤ L} contains L samples, where s l is the l − th speech sample, and the amplitudes of s l are in the range (−1, 1).
1) GAMMATONE FEATURES EXTRACTION
Divide the speech signal S into N non-overlapping frames of equal length denoted by S = [S(1), · · · , S(n), · · · , S(N )]. For every speech frame S(n), we combine three cochleagrams at different resolutions to construct the gammatone features. One high-resolution cochleagram captures global information while the other two low-resolution cochleagrams capture local information. Specifically, We pass S(n) inputs to the gammatone filter bank described in Section II-C to obtain the gammatone kernel, which is denoted by g(n). We then perform DCT on g(n) to obtain the corresponding DCT coefficients defined by D[g(n)]. Following this, we divide D[g(n)] into 580-ms segments with a 29-ms segment shift. The cochleagrams, denoted by D[g(n)] power , can be derived by computing the power of every segment at every channel. The final features are obtained by applying a logarithmic operation to D[g(n)] power . Then, the 32-channel multiresolution cochleagrams for speech frame S(n) are computed to yield the high-resolution features of the cochleagram denoted by C1(n) and expressed as
where C1(n) represents the global information of speech frame S(n). One of the low-resolution cochleagram features denoted by C2(n) can be derived by averaging C1(n) across a square window of the fourth frequency channel and four time frames centered at D[g(n)] power . Another low-resolution cochleagram feature denoted by C3(n) is computed by a similar approach, and the 17th frequency channel is used for this. All three cochleagram features C1(n), C2(n), and C3(n) are concatenated to form the features of the gammatone denoted by F(n) and described as in (4) . Then, a 32 × 3dimensional features for speech frame are given by:
2) PERCEPTUAL SPEECH HASH GENERATION The 32 × 3-dimensions features F(n) are changed to vector F (n) which has 96 × 1 dimensions. We then use a 96×48-dimensional random Gaussian matrix R(n) obtained from the CS model to obtain the compression vector F (n) as follows:
where α is a positive constant in the interval (0.5, 1), '' · '' returns the largest integer smaller than the original value, and RF(n) is the compressed version of F (n). Then, every RF(n) can be divided into M segments denoted by {RF(n, m)|n = 1, 2, · · · , N ; m = 1, 2, · · · , M }, i.e,
where the length of every segment RF(n, m) is denoted by L 1 , and L 1 = L N ·M . Then, three-dimensional (3D) DWT is performed on every segment RF(n, m) to obtain the approximate components denoted by ARF l 2 (n, m), the length of which is denoted by L 2 , where L 2 = L 2 3 ·N ·M , and l 2 = 1, 2, · · · , L 2 . Using the same methods as in parts 1) of section III-A, features of the gammatone for the M segments are computed, and the norm of every segment is calculated, and is denoted by ARF m . In this algorithm, it follows that
The mean of the M norm values is computed, and is denoted by ARF n ; then, the speech hash values are defined and concatenated as follows:
where w n (m) are the extracted speech hash values. According to Section II-B, the proposed speech hash algorithm satisfies all constraints of the perceptual speech hash. w n (m) can be proved to be a set of values of the perceptual speech hash. For speech frame S(n), we know that M perceptual speech hash values are extracted as watermark bits, and speech signal S contains N · M watermark bits. Then, the entire watermark is defined by W = {w i ∈ {0, 1}|i = 1, 2, · · · , N · M }. We describe below the pseudo-code for the proposed perceptual speech hash algorithm applicable to speech signals.
Algorithm 1 Perceptual Speech Hash Generation
Input: Original speech S, number of frames N , gaussian random matrix R(n), constant α, sampling frequency fs. Output: Perceptual speech hash W .
[RF(n, 1), · · · , RF(n, m), · · · , RF(n, M )] ← RF(n); 9 for m := 1 to M do 10 [ARF(n, m), DCs] ← dwt(RF(n, m)); 11 ARF m ← norm(ARF(n, m)); 12 ARF n ← mean(ARF 1 , · · · , ARF m , · · · , ARF M ); 
B. ROBUST SPEECH WATERMARKING
Once the perceptual speech hash as watermark has been extracted, as in Section III-A, the watermark is embedded into the robust representations mined by the learned dictionaries in the stationary wavelet transform (SWT) domain. The procedure of watermark embedding is shown in Fig. 2 . It can achieve high imperceptibility and satisfactory robustness, which are important for the authentication of the integrity of online speech signals.
In this section, the proposed robust speech watermarking algorithm based on learned dictionaries is detailed. The proposed algorithm adopts an unsupervised machine learning method to train the model of robust representations used to extract sparse representations of coefficients of SWT before and after common signal processing operations. The watermark bits are embedded into the SWT domain, which can adequately simulate the HAS. The number of approximation coefficients and their detail cannot be reduced by SWT decomposition. This has only a small impact on the vector norm of every sample of the original speech signal, and can be used to obtain a high SNR and robustness. The vector norm can be used to improve the robustness of the algorithm because the watermark embedded in the norm can be spread throughout the samples, and reduces the likelihood that the watermark is damaged. The main process is as follows: (1) Choose robust features by learning the coefficients of SWT using the learned dictionaries. (2) The vector norm is obtained and used to embed watermarks via the patchwork and QIM. Note that the learned dictionaries are used as feature extractor, and 200 WAV speech files are derived from a public audio database [27] and used to train the optimal dictionary. Details of the watermark embedding process are as below.
1) ROBUST SPEECH FEATURE EXTRACTOR FOR EMBEDDING
The original speech signal S is divided into N nonoverlapping frames of equal length denoted by S = [S(1), · · · , S(n), · · · , S(N )], and every speech frame is divided into M segments, and is denoted by S(n) = [S n (1), · · · , S n (m), · · · , S n (M )].
For every segment S n (m), where m = 1, 2, · · · , M , we divide it into two patches of equal length, denoted by S n (m, 1) and S n (m, 2), where S n (m, 1) ∩ S n (m, 2) = ∅ and S n (m, 1) ∪ S n (m, 2) = S n (m). Then, the 3D SWT with ''sym8'' is applied to decompose each patch into approximation coefficients (ACs) AC m,1 and AC m,2 , and detail coefficients (DCs) DC m,1 and DC m,2 . Watermark-related information is embedded into the ACs using patchwork and QIM. AC m,1 and AC m,2 are given by (9) and (10), respectively:
For the sake of performing learned dictionaries on the approximation coefficients AC m,1 and AC m,2 , we changed the AC m,1 and AC m,2 into blocks as follows:
where E is the number of blocks in AC m,1 or AC m,2 , and x represents the number of elements in each block. Every block is converted into a matrix of size √ x × √ x. We can then obtain the learned two patches newAC m,1 and newAC m,2 using (13) and (14) , respectively. The computational procedure of the learned ACs newAC m,1 and newAC m,2 is given in Appendix.
Compute the vector norms of newAC m,1 and newAC m,1 , denoted by normAC m,1 and normAC m,2 , respectively, and shown as follows:
Then, the robust speech features normAC m,1 and normAC m,2 are used to embed the watermark.
2) WATERMARK EMBEDDING
A pseudo-random sequence Q = {Q q |q = 1, 2, · · · , N ·M } of length N · M can be calculated using a logistic map, where key K is the initial value of the map. Then, the pseudo-random sequence Q is sorted in ascending order so that
where order(q) is the new index of q, and Sort(·) is the sort function. We use order(q) to scramble watermark W = {w i ∈ {0, 1}|i = 1, 2, · · · , N · M }, and denote the scrambled results by W = { w i ∈ {0, 1}|i = 1, 2, · · · , N · M }. Then, the values of the watermark of the n − th watermarked speech frame are denoted by { w n (m)|m = 1, 2, · · · , M }. The watermark bit w n (m) is embedded into the robust speech features normAC m,1 and normAC m,2 by a quantization method. normAC m,1 and normAC m,2 are first modified as follows:
where is the quantization step, and the difference between features QC m,1 and QC m,2 is denoted by QC m , which can be computed by
This is the watermark embedding criterion. We set QC m,1 ≥ QC m,2 when calculating QC m (when QC m,1 ≤ QC m,2 , we use the same method for embedding, and the mathematical symbols are the opposite). In addition, the rules of embedding the watermark are shown in (21)−(24) through quantification. The quantified results are denoted by QC m,1 and QC m,2 , and the rules are as follows:
Similarly, other watermark bits can be inserted into all patch pairs. After obtaining QC m,1 and QC m,2 , the coefficients of SWT are modified by
and we have AC m,1 = {ac m,1 (1), · · · , ac m,1 (b), · · · ,
Then, we apply the 3D inverse SWT with ''sym8'' to merge AC m,1 withAC m,2 , and obtain the watermarked patch pairs denoted by S n (m, 1) and S n (m, 2). The watermarked m− th segment of the n − th speech frame can be obtained as follows:
S n (m) = [S n (m, 1), S n (m, 1)]; n = 1, 2, · · · , N ; m = 1, 2, · · · , M (29)
Then, the m − th segment of the n − th watermarked speech frame can be obtained by replacing S n (m) with S n (m). The same operations are performed for every segment of every speech frame. The watermarked speech signal is then obtained, and is denoted by S = {s l |0 ≤ l ≤ L}. We detail the pseudo-code for the proposed watermarking algorithm applicable to speech signals below.
Algorithm 2 Speech Watermarking
Input: Original speech S, number of frames N , number of segments M , number of blocks E, a dictionary D, number of elements in every block x. Output: Watermarked speech signal S . 1 Set z = 1 and 2; 2 for n := 1 to N do 3 [S(1), · · · , S(n), · · · , S(N )] ← S; 4 [S n (1), · · · , S n (m), · · · , S n (M )] ← S(n); Using OMP algorithm to compute the spare representation β 1,e and β 2,e for blocks matrix1 and matrix2, via optimizing the solution follows: (1) , · · · , S n (m), · · · , S n (M )]; 28 end 29 S ← [S (1), · · · , S (n), · · · , S (N )]
C. WATERMARK DECODING AND INTEGRITY AUTHENTICATION
The process of decoding the watermark is similar to that of embedding/encoding it in the proposed algorithm, and does not require the original speech signal. At the decoding end, the segment-based procedure of the embedding process is used to partition the watermarked speech signal. We then apply the learned dictionaries from the embedding process and vector norm to these segments to obtain the extracted watermark. The procedure of the decoding and authentication of the watermark is shown in Fig. 3 , where the rule for comparison '' M m=1 w n (m) ⊕ w * n (m) ≥ M 4 ?'' is described in part 2) of Section III-C.
1) EXTRACTING WATERMARK AND RESTRUCTURING PERCEPTUAL SPEECH HASH
Suppose that the received the watermarked speech signal S subjected to common signal processing is defined by S = {s l |0 ≤ l ≤ L}, and is divided into N frames in the same way as in part 1) of section III-A, and the results are denoted by S = [S (1), · · · , S (n), · · · , S (N )]. For the n − th frame S (n), features of the 32-channel multiresolution cochleagram were computed. Using the random Gaussian matrices R(n) introduced in part 1) of Section III-A, values of the restructured perceptual speech hash are obtained in the same way as in (3)−(8), and the results are denoted by W * = {w * i ∈ {0, 1}|i = 1, 2, · · · , N ·M }, which is divided into N frames. Values of the reconstructed perceptual speech hash of the n − th watermarked speech frame are denoted by {w * n (m)|i = 1, 2, · · · , M }. We divide the n − th speech frame S (n) of length L/N into M segments denoted by S (n) = [S n (1), · · · , S n (m), · · · , S n (M )]. The length of every segment is L N ·M . We then divide every segment S n (m) into two patches, denoted by S n (m, 1) and S n (m, 2), i.e., S n (m, 1) ∩ S n (m, 2) = ∅ and S n (m, 1) ∪ S n (m, 2) = S n (m). The 3D SWT with ''sym8'' is then applied to decompose each patch into ACs AC m,1 and AC m,2 , and DCs DC m,1 and DC m,2 . AC m,1 and AC m,2 are given by (30) and (31) , respectively:
In part 1) of section III-B, the learned dictionaries given in Appendix are applied to capture the robust representations of AC m, 1 and AC m, 2 to yield newAC m, 1 and newAC m, 2, respectively. The vector norms of newAC m, 1 and newAC m, 2 are computed as follows:
Based on normAC m,1 and normAC m,2 , features QC m,1 and QC m,2 are calculated using (34) and (35), respectively:
Moreover, we can compute the difference between them, denoted by QC m , using (36):
This is the criterion for the extraction of the watermark. Watermark bit ''0'' is extracted from watermarked patch pairs if QC m / mod2 = 0, otherwise, watermark bit ''1''is extracted from the pairs. Without loss of generality, we assume that watermarked patch pairs S n (m, 1) and S n (m, 2) contain watermark bit w n (m). Then, based on the embedding rule described in the previous section, we can easily derive
For the n − th watermarked speech frame S (n), M watermark bits are obtained, and the watermarked speech signal S contains N · M watermarked bits. Then, the entire watermark can be denoted by W = {w i ∈ {0, 1}|i = 1, 2, · · · , N ·M }. According to the pseudo-random sequence Q based on the logistic map with key K , the watermark sequence can be inverse-scrambled, and the results are denoted by W = { w i ∈ {0, 1}|i = 1, 2, · · · , N · M }. This is divided into N frames; then, the extracted watermark values of the n − th watermarked speech frame are denoted by { w n (m)|i = 1, 2, · · · , N · M }.
2) AUTHENTICATION RULE
To detect the integrity of the watermarked speech signal, we compare the extracted watermark with the reconstructed perceptual speech hash for the watermarked speech signal. For the n − th frame of the watermarked speech signal, we define the number of different bits (NDB) for the compared result as follows:
where ⊕ represents the binary XOR operation. If the n − th frame of the watermarked speech signal has not been tampered with or is intact, the number of different bits satisfy NDB(n) ≤ ϑ. If the n − th frame of the watermarked speech signal has been tampered with, the number of different bits satisfy NDB(n) > ϑ. ϑ is the threshold value of the authentication scheme, and its optimal value is ϑ is M 4 , which can be deduced using (39). The optimal ϑ can ensure a minimum number of false rejection frames and false acceptance frames. We assume that the bit error rate of the authentication scheme is ϒ after being subjected to common signal processing and malicious attacks. The number of extracted watermark bits is N · M as shown in part 1) of Section III-C, and thus the number of extracted error bits is ϒ · N · M . The mean value of the term NDB(n) in (38) is defined as M NDB = ϒ·N ·M N = ϒ · M . When the extracted watermark bit is ''1'' or ''0,'' and the reconstructed perceptual speech hash is the opposite−''0'' or ''1''−with a high probability, the probability of error P n in the decoder for the n − th frame of the watermarked speech signal featuring common signal processing and malicious attacks is as follows:
where Pr{·} is the probability distribution function, and erfc(·) is the complementary error function denoted by erfc(z) = 1 − 2 √ π k 0 e −u 2 du. We know that ∞ 0 e −u 2 du = √ π 2 , and ϒ · M is the mean value in the middle of scope [0, ∞] in the distribution of the complementary error function erfc(·); thus, ϒM 0 e −u 2 du = √ π 4 . We can derive
Then the optimal ϑ is 1 4 M .
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
To evaluate the proposed algorithm, WAV files from a public audio database [27] were selected as test speech signals with 102,400 samples, of which 600 were randomly selected as mono-channel speech signals (include speech signals in English, Chinese (Mandarin), Russian, German, Japanese, and Korean) belonging to six genres (see Table 1 ). They were used as host speech signals. In all experiments, every speech clip had a duration of 2.32 seconds. The speech signals were adapted to 16-bit quantified monaural speech files, and were sampled at a rate of 44.1 kHz in WAVE format. A total of 200 watermark bits were embedded into every host speech signal at a rate of 86.13 bps. The parameters were set as follows: The host speech signals were divided into 25 frames (N = 25), and every frame was further divided into eight segments (M = 8). The quantization step was set to 0.17 ( = 0.17), the depth of sparsity in the learned dictionaries was five ( = 5), the ACs are altered to 16 (E = 16) blocks, the positive constant was 0.85 (α = 0.85) and the key was 3.7099 (K = 3.7099). We construed the perceptual speech hash as a watermark and embedded it into every host speech signal using the proposed algorithm. Moreover, the proposed algorithm was simulated on MATLAB 2015a. The computer used had a 3.40-GHz AMD Athlon(tm) II X2 270 processor with 4 GB of RAM.
A. IMPERCEPTIBILITY ANALYSIS
A feasible speech integrity authentication scheme should be robust to common signal processing while maintaining high imperceptibility. The quality of the speech signal should not degrade after inserting the watermark. That is to say, it should be difficult to acoustically differentiate the original speech from the watermarked speech. To evaluate the imperceptibility of our proposed algorithm, SNR and objective difference grade (ODG) were employed to measure the objective quality of the watermarked speech signals, and the subjective difference grade (SDG) was used to measure the subjective quality of the watermarked speech signals. SNR is the most popular time-domain metric, and is computed by comparing the distorted watermarked speech signal with the original speech signal sample by one sample. SNR is given as follows:
where s(l) is the value of the sample of the original speech signal and s (l) is that of the watermarked speech signal.
The Perceptual Evaluation Of Speech Quality (PEAQ) system (International Telecommunication Union) details the characteristics of the human auditory system (HAS). It can measure the imperceptibility of watermarked speech signals by computing an ODG value. The meaning of every score in ODG is listed in Table 2 .
Because objective metrics are known to be poor at assessing watermark imperceptibility [28] , we further evaluated imperceptibility through subjective testing. The SDG indicates the difference between the average quality grade of the watermarked signal minus that of the original signal. It represents the difference in quality in a range of 0 to −4 as listed in Table 2 . An SDG smaller than −1 implies low quality. To measure the quality of the watermarked signals, ABC/HR listening tests were conducted based on ITU-R BS.1116 [29] . Ten subjects participated in five-scale ABC/HR tests by listening to watermarked speech signals using HUAWEI CM-Q3 headsets in a quiet room.
We calculated the SNR, ODG, and SDG of the watermarked speech signals at an embedding rate of 86.13 bps and quantization step of = 0.17. The maximum, mean, and minimum values of 100 speech signals (types 1−2) are shown in Table 3 . According to given requirement, the ODG should have been greater than −1 [30] and SDG greater than −1 [29] . According to the International Federation of Phonographic Industry's (IFPI) standards, the SNR of the watermarked speech signal should not be smaller than 20 dB at any time [31] . Table 3 shows that values of the SNR of the watermarked speech signals were all above 20 dB. All values of the ODG and SDG were greater than −1. This shows that the proposed algorithm has high imperceptibility.
Furthermore, we embedded the watermark in an original speech signal at the same rate of embedding and quantization step. Fig. 4 shows waves of the original speech signal and the watermarked speech signal. There appears to be no difference between the waves, and very little difference between the watermarked speech signal and the original speech signal. This is also confirmed via values of the SNR, ODG and SDG in Table 3 . Thus, the proposed embedding method can ensure high imperceptibility.
B. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
This experiment was designed to determine whether the proposed speech integrity authentication scheme is robust to incidental changes caused by common signal processing operations. In our scheme, normalized cross-correlation (NC) and bit error rate (BER) were employed to evaluate the proposed scheme's tolerance to common signal processing operations. The different objective measures used for robustness assessment are as follows:
NC is defined as
where w i is the original watermark bit, and w i is the extracted (or reconstructed perceptual speech hash) watermark bit after undergoing certain signal processing operations. N · M is the length of the watermark extracted. A higher value of NC implies stronger tolerance of the proposed scheme to common signal processing operations. We objectively measured the robustness of the proposed authentication scheme using the BER, which is defined as
where ⊕ is the exclusivity operator, w i represents the original watermark bit, and w i represents the extracted (or reconstructed perceptual speech hash) watermark bit that had undergone signal processing operations. N · M is the length of the watermark extracted. The lower BER value implies the stronger ability of proposed scheme has to tolerate common signal processing operations.
The following common signal processing operations were used to assess robustness:
• No attack: The watermarked speech signals were not subjected to any attack.
• Additional noise: Random noise was added to the watermarked speech signals with SNR values of 25 dB and 30 dB.
• Low-pass filtering: Low-pass filters were applied to the watermarked speech signals with cut-off frequencies of 18 kHz and 20 kHz.
• High-pass filtering (HPF) attack: High-pass filters were applied to the watermarked speech signals, where the cut-off frequencies were 75 Hz and 50 Hz.
• Re-sampling: The watermarked speech signals were down-sampled to 22.05 kHz and 11 kHz, and then up-sampled to 44.1 kHz.
• Re-quantization: The watermarked speech signals were quantized down to eight and four bits, then up to 16 bits.
• MP3 compression: MPEG-1 layer-III compression was performed on the watermarked speech signals at compression bit rates 128 kbps and 96 kbps.
• AAC compression: MPEG-4 advanced speech codingbased compression was applied to the watermarked speech signals, where the bit rates for compression were 128 Kbps and 96 Kbps.
• WMA compression: WMA speech coding-based compression was applied to the watermarked speech signals, where the bit rates for compression were 48 Kbps and 32 Kbps.
• Muting attack: We randomly set samples of the watermarked speech signals to zero after every 20 and 40 samples.
• Echo addition: An echo signal with a 100 ms delay and a 30% (and 20%) decay was added to the watermarked speech signals.
• De-noising (hiss Removal): The noise in the watermarked speech signals was removed.
In the proposed speech integrity authentication scheme, both the perceptual speech hash construction algorithm and watermark embedding algorithm need to be robust against common signal processing operations. We thus evaluate their robustness as below.
(1) We calculated the values of the NC and BER of the perceptual speech hash construction algorithm subjected to common signal processing operations at an embedding rate of 86.13 bps. The signal processing operations included additional noise, low-pass filtering, high-pass filtering, re-sampling, re-quantization, MP3 compression, AAC compression, WMA compression, echo addition, muting, and denoising. The mean values of the NC and BER of 100 speech signals (speech types 1−6) are shown in Table 4 .
It is clear that the proposed algorithm delivered satisfactory performance for these common signal processing operations because they could not change the values of the gammatone features applied to perceptual speech hash production, or the features changed only slightly. The proposed method had high NC values and low BER values.
Furthermore, we compared the performance of the proposed method with state-of-the-art authentication methods [8] , [9] . Fig. 5 shows the BER values of the proposed method and those proposed in [8] , [9] at different extracting rates (ERs), with additional noise, low-pass filtering attack, high-pass filtering attack, re-sampling attack, re-quantization attack, MP3 compression attack, AAC compression attack, WMA compression attack, echo addition attack, and muting attack. The ER was given using (44). The BER values increased for the proposed method and that proposed in [8] with increasing ER, which means that their robustness decreased. Values of the BER of the method in [9] changed little with increasing of ER, which means that its robustness was not significantly affected. Of the three methods, the BER values of the proposed method were lower than those of the method in [8] and [9] at all ERs. These results verify that the proposed method outperformed those developed in [8] and [9] because its robustness benefited from the gammatone features applied. We also compare the robustness of the proposed method with those proposed in [8] and [9] against common signal processing operations in Table 5 . For fair comparison, we evaluated the robustness of the three methods at the same perceptual quality of SNR ≈ 24.5 dB and ER of 86.13 bps. The numbers in bold represent the optimal results of robustness. The proposed method had the lowest BER values and the highest NC values, and thus delivered the best performance.
ER is defined as follows: where fs is the sampling rate of the watermarked speech signal, L is its length, N · M is number of the extracted watermark bits for it, and represents the extracting rate.
(2) To assess our watermark embedding algorithm, we compared the proposed method with those developed in [18] and [19] , which also use QIM and patchwork. All three methods were tested on common signal processing operations: additional noise, low-pass filtering, high-pass filtering, re-sampling, re-quantization, MP3 compression, AAC compression, WMA compression, echo addition, muting, and de-noising. For a fair comparison, we balanced the robustness and imperceptibility of the three methods at a certain embedding rate to ensure that their rates were nearly the same. That is, we evaluated the robustness of the proposed method at a perceptual quality of SNR ≈ 24.5 dB and rate of embedding of 86.13 bps. The parameters of the methods in [18] and [19] were adjusted to render the SNR values closer to SNR ≈ 24.5 dB. Table 6 shows values of the NC and BER of the proposed method and those in [18] and [19] on common signal processing operations. The numbers in bold represent the optimal results on the above signal processing operations. As shown in Table 6 , all methods delivered satisfactory performance. The proposed method recorded a slightly higher BER and little NC than the method in [19] when subjected to additional noise and high-pass filtering, and slightly higher BER and lower NC than the method proposed in [18] when subjected to low-pass filtering. It yielded the lowest BER and highest NC when subjected to re-sampling, re-quantization, MP3 compression, AAC compression, WMA compression, echo addition, muting, and denoising. The method proposed in [19] , which uses the DCT transform and patchwork, delivered stronger performance than the proposed method in terms of eliminating the influence of additional noise and high-pass filtering on the watermarked speech signals. The method in [18] , which uses a DCT-DWT transform and vector norm, TABLE 6. Comparison of the proposed embedding scheme with the methods in [18] and [19] using common signal processing operations. The rate of embedding was 86.13 bps and SNR ≈ 24.5. The quantization step = 0.17.
outperformed the proposed method in terms of eliminating the influence of low-pass filtering on the watermarked speech signals. However, features of the SWT coefficient learned by the dictionaries were more robust to re-sampling, requantization, MP3 compression, AAC compression, WMA compression, echo addition, muting, and denoising in the proposed scheme than those in [18] and [19] .
To summarize the above discussion, the proposed method outperformed the methods proposed in [18] and [19] on common signal processing operations, and both the perceptual speech hash construction method and watermark embedding method delivered better overall performance.
C. COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY
Computational efficiency was evaluated by calculating the duration of the watermark generation (reconstitution) process for the original (watermarked) speech signal, watermark embedding process it, and the watermark extraction process for the watermarked speech signal. The three relevant algorithms were implemented in MATLAB 2015a. The gammatone filter had the most significant impact on runtime in the watermark generation (reconstitution) process, and the proposed watermark generation (reconstitution) was the fastest when a 25-channel gammatone filter was used. This is because runtime improved with decreasing number of channels, and 25 was the minimum number of channels in the gammatone filter bank. The calculation of the sparse representation of the speech ACs had the most significant impact on runtime in the watermark embedding and extraction processes, which were faster when the process of iteration of the learned dictionaries was shortened. Five iterations were used. The above operations had little effect on the robustness of proposed scheme. The runtimes of these three algorithms were recorded on an AMD Athlon(tm) II X2 270 processor with 4 GB of RAM. The CPU was set to run at maximum clock speed, 3.4 GHz. The results are given in Tables 7, 8 , and 9.
D. ANALYZING LOCATION OF TAMPERING
In applications, watermarked speech signals are inevitably subjected to common signal processing transforms. This requires that the proposed method of authentication be robust against them. That is to say, it should be able to locate the position at which malicious tampering has been carried out accurately while tolerating common signal processing operations. To test this capability, four kinds of forgeries (mute, substitution, pitch-changing, and mixed attacks) were tested on the watermarked speech signals. We used tampered speech signals subjected to additional noise, low-pass filtering, high-pass filtering, re-sampling, re-quantization, MP3 compression, AAC compression, WMA compression, echo addition, and muting. The where the value ''1'' indicates that the corresponding frame of speech signals had been maliciously tampered with, and ''0'' indicates that the corresponding frame had not been tampered with. The malicious attacks can be explained as follows:
• Mute attack: Several frames of a watermarked speech signal are silenced.
• Substitution attack: Several frames of a watermarked speech signal are replaced by another with similar characteristics from the same speech signal or another signal.
• Pitch-changing attack: The pitches of several watermarked speech frames are altered.
• Mixed attack: The watermarked speech signal is subjected to at least two of the above attacks.
Mute Attack: A mute attack represents the random replacement of partial samples of the watermarked speech signal with zeros. For our experiment featuring the mute attack, a speech signal in S 001 ∼ S 100 was selected. We obtained the watermarked speech signal by embedding the watermark using the proposed method. Sampling points 90,113−94,208 of the watermarked speech signal were muted as shown in Fig. 6 (b) . We extract the embedded watermark and compared it with the reconstructed perceptual speech hash for the watermarked speech signal. The extracted watermark bits were 10110011, and the reconstructed perceptual speech hash bits were 11010100, in the 23rd frame. There were five different bits in the 23rd frame. The results in Fig. 6 (c) show that only the 23rd speech frame had been tampered with because only samples of this frame had been destroyed. We thus see that the proposed scheme can detect and locate mute attacks accurately.
Substitution Attack 1: Substitution attack 1 involved replacing partial samples of the watermarked speech with parts of another watermarked speech signal. For our substitution attack 1 experiment, a speech signal in S 001 ∼ S 100 was selected. Sampling points 16,385−20,480 of the speech signal were replaced as shown in Fig. 7 (b) . We extracted the embedded watermark and compared it with the reconstructed perceptual speech hash for the watermarked speech signal. The extracted watermark bits were 11001001 and the reconstructed perceptual speech hash bits were 10101010 in the fifth frame. There were four different bits in the fifth frame. The results in Fig. 7 (c) show that this frame had been tampered with in the watermarked speech signal. Therefore, the proposed algorithm can detect and locate substitution attack 1 accurately. Substitution Attack 2: Substitution attack 2 involved replacing partial samples of the watermarked speech with parts of another non-watermarked speech signal. For our substitution attack 2 experiment, a speech signal in S 001 ∼ S 100 was selected. Samples 36,865−40,960 of the watermarked speech signal were replaced. We extracted the embedded watermark and compared it with the reconstructed perceptual speech hash for the watermarked speech signal. The extracted watermark bits were 01101100 and the reconstructed perceptual speech hash bits were 11010100 in the 10th frame. There were four different bits in the 10th frame. The results are shown in Fig. 8 (c) , from which it is clear that this frame had been tampered with. Therefore, the proposed algorithm can detect and locate substitution attacks 2 accurately.
Pitch-Changing Attack: In this attack, the pitch of a frame was altered, e.g., by replacing the voice of a man with that of a woman in part of the audio. For our pitch attack experiment, a speech signal in S 001 ∼ S 100 was selected. Samples 65,537−69,632 of the watermarked speech signal were altered by changing their pitch. We extracted the embedded watermark and compared it with the reconstructed perceptual speech hash for the watermarked speech signal. The extracted watermark bits were 10101110 and the reconstructed hash bits were 01110101 in the 17th. There were six different bits in this frame. The results are shown in Fig. 9 (c). It is clear that the 17th frame had been tampered with. Therefore, the proposed algorithm can detect and locate pitch-changing attacks accurately.
Mixed Attack: A mixed attack involves destroying partial samples of the watermarked speech signals with two attacks at the least. For our mixed attack experiment, a speech signal in S 001 ∼ S 100 was selected. Samples 122,897−16,384 of the watermarked speech were replaced by parts of another speech signal, and samples 45,057−49,152 were altered by changing their pitch. We extracted the embedded watermark and compared it with the reconstructed perceptual speech hash for the watermarked speech signal. The extracted watermark bits were 010110111 and the reconstructed perceptual speech hash bits were 100111011 in the fourth frame. There were four different bits in this frame. The extracted watermark bits were 10110001 and the reconstructed perceptual speech hash bits are 10010110 in the 12th frame, in which there were four different bits. The results are shown in Fig. 10 (c) , from which it is clear that the fourth an 12th frames of the watermarked speech signal had been tampered with. Therefore, the proposed algorithm can detect and locate mixed attacks accurately.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a perceptual speech hash algorithm and a watermarking algorithm were proposed. Based on the perceptual speech hash and watermark embedding algorithm, a speech integrity authentication scheme was developed and tested. As a tool for speech integrity authentication, the proposed scheme is tolerant to common signal processing manipulations, such as MP3 compression, adding noise, filtering, and re-sampling. It is, however, sensitive to changes caused by malicious attacks, and achieves a trade-off between robustness and imperceptibility. Experimental results and performance analyses verified the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in detecting four kinds of attacks. It can be used for content-based speech integrity authentication and speech retrieval on large-scale speech databases. It is important to note that de-synchronization attacks were not considered in the proposed speech integrity authentication scheme.
APPENDIX LEARNED SPEECH ACS OVER LEARNED DICTIONARIES
The approach used [32] for image denoising is based on sparse and redundant representations over trained dictionaries, and can be used to derive expressions for the robustness of speech ACs AC m,1 and AC m,2 by training the learned dictionaries as below.
To obtain the sparse representation of speech AC blocks of size √ x × √ x, we need to define a dictionary (matrix) of size D ∈ R p×q , which is redundant when q > p. Then, dictionary D is assumed to be known and fixed, and we construct a sparse land model (we define it as D − ACs − sparseland) so that every two AC blocks AC x m,1 (e) and AC x m,2 (e) can be represented sparsely over D. In other words, it is sparse and can be compressed as follows: where β 1 and β 2 can be regarded as two sensor matrices, and β 1 0 and β 1 0 are the numbers of non-zero entries in β 1 and β 2 , respectively. The two AC blocks AC x m,1 (e) and AC x m,2 (e) can be represented as a linear combination of a few atoms from the redundant dictionary D. More precisely, the rough constraints D · β 1 ≈ AC x m,1 (e) and D·β 2 ≈ AC x m,2 (e) can be represented as D·β 1 − AC x m,1 (e) 2 ≤ δ and D · β 2 − AC x m,2 (e) 2 ≤ δ, respectively, where δ is the allowed error boundary. We define the depth of sparsity as , which means the sparse representation uses no more than atoms from the dictionary for every two AC blocks AC m,1 and AC m,2 . Then, our model D − ACs − sparseland with parameters δ and is well formulated. We can thus assume that AC blocks AC m,1 and AC m,2 indeed belong to the D − ACs − sparseland model. Then, we can rewrite (A.1) and (A.2) as follows: where is controlled by δ. Therefore, the learned AC blocks are obtained by AC x m,1 (e) = D · β 1 , AC x m,2 (e) = D · β 2 . When proper parameters µ 1 and µ 2 are selected, the optimization task above is equal to β 1 = arg min which renders the representation easy to calculate. This problem is also difficult to solve. The matching and basis pursuit algorithms can be used to obtain an approximated solution.
In this task, orthonormal matching pursuit (OMP) can be used due to its simplicity and efficiency. AC m,1 and AC m,2 are completely expressed by the fact that every two blocks AC x m,1 (e) and AC x m,2 (e) in them belong to the model D − ACs − sparseland. Then, the generalized sparse presentations of AC m,1 and AC m,2 are replaced by { β 1,e , newAC m,1 } = arg min where 1 and 2 are the sparse versions of AC m,1 and AC m,2 , respectively, and λ is dictated by δ. Every two blocks AC x m,1 (e) = R 1,e AC m, 1 and AC x m,2 (e) = R 2,e AC m,2 of size √ x × √ x at location e of AC m,1 and AC m,2 have sparse representations with bounded errors µ 1 and µ 2 , respectively. R 1,e and R 2,e are x × L NM −dimensional matrices used to obtain the e − th blocks from AC m,1 and AC m,2 . We then search for the optimal sparse representations β 1,e and β 2,e of each location in AC m,1 and AC m,2 , respectively. In doing so, we obtain a complete decoupling of the minimization task to many smaller ones. Each of them handles two blocks as follows: We solve these issues by using orthonormal matching pursuit, gathering two atoms at a time for blocks AC x m,1 (e) and AC x m,2 (e), and stopping when the errors D · β 1 − AC x m,1 (e) 2 2 and D · β 2 − AC x m,2 (e) 2 2 are below . Thus, this stage functions as a sliding-window sparse coding stage for every two blocks AC x m,1 (e) and AC x m,2 (e) at a time. Given all β 1,e and β 2,e , the update can be computed by newAC m, 1 
